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The Experiment of Operating a Decentralized World
Credit Structure in an Unbalanced World Economy
In the history of the international gold standard 1928—29
a landmark because it was the only year during which that
standard was almost universally in effect in countries not
ditionally attached to silver. In Chapter 13 its claims to be
considered not only a landmark, but also a major turning
point, were enumerated, and in the elaborate analysis sub-
sequently given of the position and interrelations of indi-
vidual currencies from 1925 to 1929 these claims have been
substantiated. A vantage point has now been reached from
which to survey the road traveled by the international gold
standard after 1914, free from the burden of detail necessary
for a correct understanding of the steps along the way. A
broad retrospective view of the progress of the institution as
a whole along this road has led to our condensing the attri-
butes of the period i 925—31 into the single phrase: the Ex.
periment of Operating a Decentralized World Credit Struc-
ture in an Unbalanced World Economy. This phrase suggests
the two general comparisons by means of which the funda-
mental historical evolution of the gold standard after 1914 can
best be pictured: one, between the completed structure of
1928—29 and the pre-war system; the other, between the oper-
ation of the gold standard in 1925—29 and in the war years.
The first comparison emphasizes the essential dissimilarities
in two systems superficially similar, the second emphasizes the
essential similarities of two environments superficially dis-
similar.
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Certain Salient Features of the
System, Recapitulation
The most striking single feature of the pre-war gold standard
system was the highly integrated world banking structure
centered in London and operating on the basis of the strong
international creditor position of Great Britain. This system
of banking provided for an efficient and rational distribution
of long and short term credit and of gold on a world-wide
scale. It provided a common medium of payment for the
financing of world trade, just as a national banking system
provides a domestic currency for the financing of domestic
trade. It was also the center of a system of international clear-
ance which resulted in the same sort of banking economies
that intra- and interbank clearance provides in any banking
system.
The world's foreign exchange markets were interconnected
through London, and in many instances remittance from one
market to another was habitually made in sterling, in pref-
erence to direct remittance. London was the world center for
the clearance of foreign exchange transactions, though smaller
patterns centered directly around Paris, Berlin, and New
York were woven into the main design of the picture. In this
pre-war system of foreign exchange markets all countries had
a substantial interest in keeping their particular currencies
as stable as possible in terms of sterling, and their success in
doing so contributed to the stability of their currencies in
terms of one another.
One reason for this interest in keeping the London ex-
change stable was that the world-wide price making forces
of primary raw materials were brought to a focus in world
markets in London and Liverpool. British consumer demand
was a dominant influence in the formation of many of these
prices, of which the price of wool is a good example. In addi-
tion, the British view of the prospects of primary commodities
had a great psychological influence in other countries, andTHE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE
throughout the continent buyers and sellers followed the
British traders' lead. The world prices established in the
British markets were a common element in the price
tures of many countries. Their fluctuations in response to
world-wide supply arid demand forces directly
the incomes of large groups of producers in many
and consequently the demand for many products not
in internationally. They affected domestic costs of produc-
tion. The international influence of the London or
price of many important commodities was therefore a facto:
tending to prevent substantial divergence in the
of general prices of countries adhering to the
gold standard.
Before the war balances of payments changed rather slowly
in their composition as countries passed through successive
stages of economic development. The character of
tional trade as a whole was slowly changing as the
wide spread of industrialization altered, in unequal degree
and at varying rates, the economic life of many important
countries. On the whole, however, the strains imposed by
these dynamic forces of economic growth were adequately
met by short and long term advances provided by a highly
centralized world banking system. Great Britain was by no
means the only international lender, and British internationa]1
bankers, like other bankers, were dependent on their die-
positors.' Yet this system was London-centered. Many of the
international transactions of other financial centers, such as
the large scale security arbitrage transactions of the French
banks, were passed through London. Paris, Amsterdam,
Berlin were vital, but subordinate parts of a system of which
London was the leader. As a source of short term credit ac-
commodation London was preeminent, and large as were the
long term capital exports of France, especially to the rest
'Mr. Smit has pointed out that there were times before the World War, e.g.,
immediately after the Boer War, when it was difficult to transfer even
sumsfrom London.776 EXPERIMENTATION
Europe, they were dwarfed by the far greater and more di-
versified export of capital from England. British loans fi-
nanced the development of many parts of the world, guided
the application of natural resources, and made it possible for
the large scale international exchange of goods to be spread
over long periods. The whole complex of relationships cre-
ated by the making, repayment, and renewal of long term
loans provided a further powerful incentive toward the
maintenance of stable exchange rates on London by the out-
side world, and, in ways we have described, helped to main-
tain that stability. Stability of the exchanges, in turn, pro-
moted new foreign lending, and there was here, as in so
many aspects of pre-war gold standard history, an interaction
of cause and effect.
In the pre-war gold standard system London was the center
for the distribution of most of the world's newly mined gold
and of the world's trade in gold. The dynamic influence of
the financing of trade and the distribution of new capital
from London resulted in an international distribution of
gold that was responsive to both the short term requirements
of exchange stability and the long run needs of banking and
currency systems. The long term distribution of gold was
greatly influenced by the process of foreign long term lend-
ing which helped the more rapidly developing countries to
meet their expanding credit requirements without frequent
and violent checks• due to the inadequacy of gold reserves,
and without upsetting the conditions required for stability
of exchange rates. This system of gold distribution was able
to adapt itself to certain peculiarities in the banking or-
ganization and practice of individual countries, in particular
to the steady absorption of gold by the Bank of France, but
was subject to severe dislocations from such unexpected in-
stitutional changes as those which brought America suddenly
into the gold market in 1906. At times of severe cyclical
depression it worked to the disadvantage of debtor countries
and was a cause of world-wide disturbance. But such eventsTHE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE 777
were not the characteristic staple of pre-war experience as
they came to be after the war. Consequently, the passage of
large supplies of new gold through the London bullion
market was safeguard enough to allow the Bank of England
to conduct its operations with a relatively small gold reserve.
In such an environment the Bank was able to induce by its
discount policy gold movements to and from England of the
corrective character long the center of gold standard analysis,
without greatly interfering either with seasonal flows or the
fundamentally important movements of the metal that may
be described as residual.
Our analysis has convinced us that the most important
factors of adjustment in this highly integrated pre-war sys•
tern of international finance were movements of credit, both
long and short term. We have assigned a minor role to gold
as an equilibrating factor in international trade. But as a
confidence-inspiring factor and a limiting factor on bank
credit expansion the world over, it was, of course, of first
importance. All the conditions summarized above, combined
with the all important element of confidence supplied by
the legal guarantees of the convertibility of balances in Lon-
don into gold, provided the basis for a highly sensitive move-
ment in the holdings by different countries of an interna-
tional bill portfolio, and the confident movement of bank
balances and of securities between London and other mar-
kets.
These movements of gold and capital bound the world
money markets together. They provided a machinery for the
equalization of interest rates, not of course sufficient to elimi-
nate the permanent differences resulting from the funda-
mental relations between the supply and demand for capital
in different parts of the world, but sufficient to bind the
money markets into a world system sensitive in all its parts
to changes taking place in the center and in other parts.2
2Thisinterdependence of money markets has been analyzed in a statistical
treatment of gold flows, exchange rates, and differential interest rates between778 EXPERIMENTATION
This pre-war system gave to the world for many years an
essentially stable system of exchange rates. The highly elabo-
rate techniques employed conformed to the fundamental
requirements of efficient banking. But their effectiveness in
turn rested on two great foundation stones. The first was the
economic position of Great Britain as a great importer of
raw materials and a great exporter of manufactured goods,
capable of vast internal capital accumulation and induced
to employ thesesavings abroad by therelatively low
return to capital at home. Even before the war this first
foundation stone was exposed to influences tending to un-
dermine it. The rapid industrialization of Germany had al-
ready subjected the gold standard system to a considerable
strain, and German competition runs like a leitmotif through
the testimony of those we have consulted concerning the
operation of the London financial system during the decades
immediately preceding the war. It is probable that, had there
been no war, some of the characteristic features of the gold
standard as it existed in 1914wouldhave had to be modified.
In fact, the growing coordination in the seasonal influences
in the Berlin money market with those in London, while
at the same time cyclical influences in the two markets were
showing more and more independent characteristics, is evi-
dence of the development of a new situation.8 The second
foundation stone was the development, empirically, under
the leadership of the Bank of England, of a stable and con-
servative type of banking management in England.4 In an
international financial system with a single center the first
principle of international financial stability is stable credit
conditions at the center, and this requirement, on the whole,
was splendidly met by England before the war.
London, Paris, Berlin, and New York prepared in connection with these
studies by A. G. Silverman.
8Theserelationships are shown statistically in Mr. Silverman's study.
Mr. Smit's pre-war analysis deals with this development statistically and
draws out its international implications.THE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE 779
TheCompleted Gold Standard Facade of 1928—1929
compared with the Pre-War System
The devastating effects of the World War and its aftermath
upon the very foundations of pre-war international economic
and financial relationships have been brought out with curnu
lative effect by our detailed analysis of the effort first to main
tamand then to return to the gold standard from 1914to
1928. In place of integration and a harmonious relatfion
among the complex elements of the world's economic and
financial structure, these fifteen years present a picture of con•
flict and lack of balance alleviated by a series of powerful, but
improvised and opportunistic, cooperative expedients to hold
the system together. From 1914to1918 the effort to maintain
the outward semblance of the gold standard, and from 1924
to 1928 the triumphant restoration of its external forms,
served to obscure in some degree this fundamental change.
But between 1919and1924thephenomena we have de-
scribed by the phrase America Drags Her Golden Anchor
raised questions about the true significance of gold in the
modern world that can not be evaded, and demonstrated the
inadequacy of traditional ways of thinking and feeling about
gold as guides to policy in times of fundamental change.
These years provided a window through which the real na-
ture of the problems inherited from the war, and those
ned forward into the period of Experimentation, could be
seen clearly. The true comparison between the completed
gold standard facade and the pre-war international gold
standard system can be made only in the light of the prospect
seen through the 'window' of the Restoration period.
The pre-war financial and economic system was the prod.
uct of growth and slow evolution. The war had violently dis.
turbed this system, and it was the practical problem of
post-war generation to find a way of piecing it together. The
effort to do so was in part a failure because the post-war
generation was not successful in distinguishing between the780 EXPERIMENTATION
form and the substance of a great international institution
—the gold standard—which had served it well in the past.
In the first place, the war left behind it varying degrees of
monetary inflation, and for the first time in the history of the
international gold standard some method of establishing a
new system of exchange rates between all the most important
countries of the world had to be devised. The solution of this
problem—the stabilization problem proper—was arrived at
by the sovereign choice of independent powers rather than
by international agreement, and introduced into a situation
already sufficiently complicated a new set ofdifficulties
known as under- and overvaluations of currencies. These dif-
ficulties were carried forward into the period of Experimen-
tation, but by 1928—29, under- and overvaluation of the
major currencies, as an economic factor directly affecting
trade, had receded somewhat into the background because of
a partial adjustment of price structures. The choice of new
pars of exchange left a serious heritage, chiefly because it
contributed during the first years of the return to gold to the
weakness of sterling and the strength of the franc and there-
fore was partly responsible for the course of banking policy
in England and France.
The actual choice of stabilization rates did not, however,
strike at the inner springs of stability as they existed before
the war. These inner springs of stability were found in the
combination of good and highly centralized international
banking and a fundamentally harmonious relation between
the financial and commodity elements in the international
balance of payments of countries adhering to the gold stand-
ard. The war in a few years did the work of decades of
normal development in changing these financial and trade
relationships. It left a series of balance of payments situations
that could never have arisen under the pre-war gold standard
system. It laid the foundations for a new relation between the
agricultural and extractive industries and manufacturing in-
dustries all over the world. By the creation of new frontiersTHE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE 781
itproduced the strongest motives for overproduction. At the
same time it created an abnormal demand for the goods of
creditor countries and accentuated the basic anomaly of crecL-
itor countries with commodity export surpluses and debtor
countries with commodity import surpluses. The war weak-
ened the creditor position of Great Britain and brought to
an end the era of her industrial domination begun a century
before. It left the United States a great creditor power, and
as a result of reparations, made Germany the world's greatest
debtor.
These changes persisted throughout Restoration and on
into Experimentation. They did strike at the roots of
pre-war system. In the gold standard world of 192 8—29 Lon
don was subject to new and powerful competition. The war
had raised up in New York a competing money market oper.
ated on the basis of a newly created and very powerful
national creditor position and ambitious to share with Lon-
don the role of the world's banker, if not to replace it as the
greatest international money market. Other markets, such as
Amsterdam, cherished similar ambitions on a smaller scale
during the reconstruction period. The process of returning
to gold, moreover, as it actually worked out, gave France a
temporary pull over the exchanges which she had never pre.
viously exercised, even though before the war she was a
major creditor power. The essential difference between the
international gold standard of 1928—29 and that of 1914 was
that when the world returned to gold after the war it buik
its international financial system around a nucleus and
around a single center. A temporary union of discordant ele.
ments passed under the general designation of the gold
standard.
The British banking system emerged from the war with a
remarkable record of achievement, and remained true to
many of its fundamental traditions. The joint stock banks
returned, in the main, to their pre-war practices in the distri..
bution of their assets and gradually reestablished a ratio sys-.782 EXPERIMENTATION
tern that allowed control by the Bank of England of the credit
base to be felt throughout the credit superstructure. The
Bank of England, however, was to base its policy on
new criteria of action and to supplement on an ever increas-
ing scale its old techniques of market control by new and
more powerful devices. The highly specialized mechanism of
the London money market was technically less efficient than
it had been. In particular, the amount of sterling bills grow-
ing out of the financing of international trade had declined
and British treasury bills had taken their place in the short
term market. This change had the effect of narrowing the
market for sterling and making the exchanges less responsive
to the influence of Bank rate. The sterling bill did not pro-
vide a world medium for financing world trade, and London
did not perform the function of an international clearing
house in quite the same way as before the war.
There were other changes in the London market. Balances
of foreigners held in London before the war were kept there
for genuine business reasons—because they were needed to
meet recurring obligations. They were, in effect, the world's
average balances in the world's active commercial bank. Lon-
don exercised what Mr. Smit has called 'a deposit-compelling
power' far greater than that of any other money market in
the world. The post-war period witnessed a dangerous growth
of unfaithful money and added to the world's problems that
of unfaithful securities. The international loan fund had al-
ways been mobile, but that mobility was not formless—it had
a focal point. After the war the movement of balances and
securities from one market to another was both large and er-
ratic, and this had a profound influence upon the effective-
ness and the practice of London as an international financial
center.
The world's foreign exchange markets were still character-
ized after the war by the general triangular pattern of pre-
war days. London was still the great market for dollars for
all continental and Empire countries and for Japan. ParisTHE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE
was still the great foreign exchange trading market for tho
continent, and New York for the Canadian exchange. But
London had become more active as a trading market in aL
exchanges. Sterling had not lost its character as a great
national currency, but it had lost its unchallenged primacy.
London was no longer in the same degree the place where the
debits and credits resulting from foreign exchange trading
in other centers were offset by transfers on the books o
banks. The motives that had led all countries to endeavor to
preserve stability of their rates in terms of sterling, though
still powerful enough to create a group of so-called sterling.
countries persisting throughout the period of war and recon-
struction, were neither so universal nor so powerful as before.
Under the new conditions the continued use of sterling
the medium of remittance between other countries became
a source of strain and disturbance in the world's exchanges
rather than the reflection of the stabilizing activity of the
world's centralized international banking machinery. Because
of London's new relation to international clearance, and be-
cause of the weakened position of British goods in the world's
export markets, sterling was on the defensive in the gold
standard world of 1928—29, and Great Britain was therefore
obliged to put a guard upon her long term lending and re-
late it more closely to the immediate requirements of her
hard pressed export industry than in the days of her pre-
dominance. The writ of London no longer ran throughout
the world.
When Great Britain returned to gold she was followed by
a group of sterling countries which remained as distinctly a
group of sterling countries after the gold standard was rees-
tablished as they were before. The significance of this lies not
so much in the fact that the relations of these countries to
England and to the pound were such as to give sterling a
predominant influence over them in comparison with the in-
fluence of the franc or the dollar as in the fact that similar
relationships to the pound that had previously existed over a784 EXPERIMENTATION
much wider area before the war were no longer present. We
have in these studies sometimes used the expression that be-
Fore the war the international gold standard was in effect a
sterling exchange standard. The existence of a separately
definable sterling area after the war is a measure of the de-
gree to which this generalization was no longer true.
The whole relation of the United States to other members
of the international gold standard system as it existed in 1928
was that of a country whose policy was dominated by a series
of domestic problems that made it difficult for her to exercise
her great power over other currencies without sacrificing at
times the general international interest, and made it difficult,
conversely, for her to adapt her policies to the immediate in-
ternational situation, without danger to her own internal
position. Some of the most difficult aspects of this dilemma
were the direct outgrowth of the experience of the United
States as the only great power that adhered to the forms of the
international gold standard from 1919to1924. The ultimate
domestic and international effects of the great effort of inter-
national cooperation, which we have described as the Critical
Decisions of 1927, can be fully understood only in the light of
the preceding period of delayed gold inflation in the United
States.
The essential elements, moreover, that contribute to the
capacity of any money market to be an international financial
center were developed in very unequal degree in New York.
The world markets in basic raw materials continued to be, in
the main, centered in London and Liverpool, while New
York was growing rapidly in importance as a market for in-
ternational transactions in securities. The international func-
tion of lending was far more largely transferred to New York
than was the international function of clearance. The institu-
tional equipment and the money market techniques devised
to take care of the new responsibilities were in many respects
hastily improvised. Finally New York, as an international
Financial center, faced peculiarly difficult problems, becauseTHE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE 785
America continued to be a magnet for capital from abroad,
and because New York was the domestic money market for a
continent embracing within a single political jurisdiction
areas of extremely diverse economic characteristics.
Great Britain and the United States together were the ac-
tive nucleus that replaced the single center of pre-war days,
but the position and policy of France vitally affected their
mutual as well as their joint relations to the outlying coun-
tries. France, indeed, was a sort of powerful silent partner in
the central nucleus of the post-war international gold stand-
ard system. She returned to gold under circumstances that
gave her a power over that system disproportionate to her
economic strength. Her bitter experience in the loss of almost
all her pre-war foreign investments led her to renounce, for
the time being, her traditional role as a long term interna-
tional lender, and either to allow currently accumulating
credits in her balance of payments to remain in short term
foreign employment or to bring them home in gold. A situa-
tion therefore arose in which the more faithfully French pol-
icy adhered to the technical procedures of the orthodox gold
standard the more difficult it became for the creditor powers
as a group to fulfil the basic role that Great Britain fulfilled
in the uni-centric system of pre-war days. Conversely, the
more consistently France refrained from bringing home her
foreign assets, the more competitive pressure arose between
the two central markets for the profitable employment of her
balances.
When one after another the countries of the world that
may be described as. outlying or debtor countries, as well as
the smaller European creditor countries, returned to the gold
standard, they related themselves to a nucleus of center coun-
tries containing forces of internal disruption, while at the
same time the solution of their own economic problems de-
pended largely upon the harmonious joint action of these
center countries. As long as the stream of American and Brit-
ish long and short term loans continued to flow into debtor786 EXPERIMENTATION
countries, and as long as through this process the interna-
tional credits of France currently accumulating in the two
central markets were reinvested in debtor countries, there
was in effect common action by the nucleus. As a result, the
great illusion that the world had regained stability by return-
ing to the safe harbor of gold remained intact. America expe-
rienced no difficulty in maintaining her export trade and her
tariff policy; Germany was able to regain working capital,
import essential raw materials and make large payments on
reparation account; France was able to maintain internal sta-
bility, restore her government credit, finance the rebuilding
of the devastated areas, and expand her exports, and England
was given respite during which she might readjust her indus-
trial structure to the new competitive situation and resume
her position as the world's banker.
Under these circumstances a new type of interdependence
grew up among money markets. The kind of cooperation and
competition of money markets characteristic of pre-war days,
which worked out its results through gold movements and
movements of short term credit and securities responding to
the currents of trade and to the movement of interest rates,
still continued in a measure to bind the money markets of the
world into a system. But these influences were often subordi-
nated to other more violent forces. For example, from 1925
to the middle of 1928.there was a distinct tendency toward an
international equalization of interest rates through the
international movement of capital, but after the middle of
1928 this tendency ended because of the violent movements
of funds associated with the American speculation.6 This was
but a striking example of the manner in which the extraor-
dinary mobility of the international loan fund and its in-
creased size after the war made the pre-war type of inter-
national money market adjustment recurrently inadequate.
Following the Macmillan Committee we have called it the
League of Nations, Course and Phases of the World Economic Depression,
prepared by Bertil Ohlin (rev. ed.. Geneva, pp.32—3.THE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE 787
rise of international deposit banking. Among its causes were
flights of capital from one country after another, from Aus-
tria, Germany, France, and England, and from many smaller
countries; the establishment and operation of and with-
drawal from the gold exchange standard; the undervaluation
of currencies; the replacement, in the international move-
ment of funds, of the technique of finance bills by the tech-
nique of the forward exchange markets; the payment of large
political international debts; the establishment of abnormal
intermarket interest rate relationships as a result of unbal-
anced trade; the appearance of abnormal interest differentials
between the short and long term markets, and the appearance
of deposits, notably those related to the gold exchange stand-
ard, that could not move from short to long term employ-
ment as a result of interest rate differentials; the competition
of money markets for supremacy in international finance, and
finally the growth of private investment in securities in for-
eign markets by countless individuals and institutions for the
sake of capital appreciation and for safety, rather than for in-
come or temporary employment.
Loss of a genuinely balanced interchange of goods and
permanently invested funds among the nations, and the er-
ratic and often unmanageable behavior of the international
loan fund altered the role of gold as an equilibrating factor
in the world's balances of payments and often converted its
confidence-inspiring and limiting functions in the world's
banking systems into sources of danger and confusion.
The greatest single factor making for gold economy before
1914 was that the problem of international clearance was of
manageable proportions and that there was a centralized and
efficient mechanism for effecting that clearance. The ele-
mentary banking maxim that the more perfect the clearance
the less the need for cash was exemplified on a world scale.
The whole history of gold movements during and after the
war illustrates the converse of that principle. Gold was at-
tracted for long periods to certain countries as a substantial788 EXPERIMENTATION
part of the merchandise balance of trade. Gold was moved in
large quantities for special central banking operations and
was hoarded in unprecedented amounts. The causes of gold
movements became less and less directly related to the move-
ment of goods in international trade and to the international
investment of capital for productive purposes. The influence
of special internal credit and currency problems in particular
countries upon gold movements became more and more im-
portant, and, in a world in which there were two centers of
gold distribution instead of one, many sudden shifts in the
locus of the world demand for gold took place, often as a re-
suit of the movement of unfaithful balances and unfaithful
securities between the two central markets. The restoration
of the forms of the international gold standard from 1924 to
1928 did not eliminate the underlying forces leading to this
new type of international gold distribution.
Deprived of its greatest instrument of gold economy
through its lack of economic balance, the world turned to
two others: the concentration of gold in the hands of central
banks and the development of the gold exchange standard.
The single great change in the external forms of the inter-
national gold standard of 1928—29 from that of 1914was,
therefore, the elimination of gold from actual circulation and
the wide prevalence of the gold bullion standard. This was a
successful gold economy measure, and in 1928 it cannot be
said that the gold reserves of the world's central banks were
inadequate to meet the demands actually made upon them,
though it was true that without the hidden reserve of the cir-
culation to fall back upon, and in the face of new and grave
uncertainties in the future, the estimates of central bankers
as to what constituted an adequate gold reserve were con-
tinually being revised upward. The gold exchange standard,
unlike the gold bullion standard, was developed on a great
scale not purely as a gold economy measure, but partly as a
byproduct of stabilization operations. As a consequence, it
was participated in on a large scale by one of the center coun-THE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE 789
tries, France, and with the beginning of an incipient eco
nomic depression, gold exchange balances tended to flow in.to
the hands of the central banks of other creditor countries. In
a decentralized financial system the gold exchange standard
was dangerous under these circumstances. Before the war it
had been, like the gold standard itself, in reality a sterling
exchange standard, and gold exchange balances were cen-
tered in London and were of moderate amount. But the post-
war gold exchange standard had no focal point. The balances
created under it were free to move and did move from one
creditor market to another. They were sufficiently large to
create administrative problems in the markets that received
them, and they accentuated the differences between long and
short term rates of interest. Furthermore, the countries whose
balances were in absolute amount the most important did not
regard their own use of the gold exchange standard as perma-
nent.
The techniques by which the international gold standard,
as it stood in 1928—29, was operated were in many respects
improvisations that modified pre-war practices, and that were
made necessary because the foundations of the whole system
were not those of the pre-war period. New agencies were re-
quired to carry them into effect, and old agencies had to be
endowed with new powers and new authority. This was ac-
complished by the process we have described as the Rise of
New Central Banks and New Central Banking. The inter-
national gold standard of 1928—29 was equipped with the
means of conscious and planned inter-money market coopera-
tion under the guidance of a centralized control within each
individual market, to replace the pre-war of money
markets,' achieved under the guiding influence of London
through gold, exchange, interest, and security arbitrage. But
in this it was armed with a double edged sword, for these
instruments of cooperation could equally well be employed
as weapons of competition and conflict.
There was one further major contrast between the pre-war790 EXPERIMENTATION
gold standard system and the system of 1928—29. The funda-
mental prerequisite for international financial stability—sta-
ble internal credit conditions at the center—was not met. In
an international financial system based upon two centers, this
prerequisite is that there shall be stable credit conditions in
both centers. The history of the English banking system from
1922 to 1929 was one of stability, enforced, it is true, by new
techniques of management, subject to a certain degree of in-
ternal conflict, and in a measure divorced from its pre-war
intimate connection with international financial transactions
—but still a history of moderation and restraint. The history
of the American banking system was one of steady and per-
sistent credit expansion, pursued through a complicated and
at times rather devious path, and based fundamentally upon
the acquisition by the commercial banks of cash resources on
a very large scale independently of the central bank. This
history we have compressed into the single phrase, the One-
Way American Banking System.
There was in the post-war period great pressure for capital
exports, not only to help stabilize currencies, replace depleted
supplies of capital in countries injured by the war, recon-
struct devastated areas, and develop natural resources, but also
to finance large one-way movements of goods and one-way
payments of political debts. The responsibility for respond-
ing to this pressure, like that of providing an international
medium of payment other than gold, and of distributing
short term credit was divided primarily between London
and New York. After 1926 this responsibility was shared
also by France. For special reasons each of these three markets
was impelled to pursue a somewhat independent policy in
meeting this responsibility. The situation in the world was
similar to that of a local clearing house with three members
of nearly equal importance, each pursuing an independent
policy in the extension of credit. As long as these independent
policies were not in direct conflict the problems of world
finance could be faced without disaster. This was still true atTHE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE
the beginning of 1928, but during that year the lack of funda-
mental balance in the underlying trade relations of the world,
and in the debtor and creditor positions inherited from the
war, began to make its presence felt. More and more strains
were imposed upon the whole relationship of the center coun-
tries to the outlying countries, and upon the relationships
among the center countries themselves. The international.
gold standard system could no longer postpone the
quences of having, by the de facto cooperation of the coun-
tries composing the nucleus, carried forward a series of great
unsolved economic problems, just as had been done during
the war.
Carrying forward Unsolved Economic Problems
General Comparison with the War-time System
The unsolved economic problems after the return to gold
were more complex than those of the war years. They were
stubborn and intractable. The price that had to be paid to
solve them was too high to be paid willingly. Therefore ulti-
mate solutions were postponed, and for several years
world enjoyed a false sense of economic security.
An Unbalanced World Economy
In some ways the period 1925—29 had the characteristics of a
boom. Production, especially of raw materials and durable
consumers goods, and the volume of international trade,
pecially trade in m4nufactured articles, increased greatly.
The quantum of world trade expanded more rapidly
production, just as before the war, and its rate of growth was
also greater. The causes of this growth in production and
trade were both technological and economic. F. C. Mills cites
three major technological causes: an extraordinary advance
in industrial technique, improvement in the means of
munication, and a technological advance in methods of
cultural production, amounting almost to an agricultural rev-
olution; and two major economic causes: the completion cf792 EXPERIMENTATION
Europein reconstruction and the stabilization of the foreign
exchanges with the consequent resumption of international
lending.6 Basic economic maladjustments, however, were ma-
turing which were partly the consequence of the technologi-
cal advances themselves and partly inheritances from the war.
THE CONTINUING LEGACY OF THE WORLD WAR
The influence of the World War upon the character and dis-
tribution of world production and trade has been a basic
element in our analysis of the post-war gold standard, par-
ticularly in connection with the position of Great Britain and
the United States. It has frequently been summed up by such
phrases as a New Economic Environment, the Underlying
Strength of the Dollar, and the Weakening of Great Britain's
Basic Pull over the Exchanges. Beginning about 1924—25, the
unsolved problems of this new economic environment were
made more acute by a series of events in themselves highly
desirable from a long run point of view. Certain countries,
notably Germany and Russia, temporarily eliminated from
effective international competition during the Restoration
period, once more attempted to resume their pre-war partici-
pation in the world's economic life, but room had to be made
for them. Europe as a whole began to regain its lost ground
in international trade, but this tended to alter the precarious
world balance partly achieved during the long period of in-
terrupted normal growth. The character of international
trade continued to exhibit, even more strongly, the changes
noted in and, from a long run point of view, welcomed by the
Balfour Report—less exchange of finished goods for raw ma-
terials and more exchange of one type of manufactured goods
for another—but these changes imperiled vested interests and
gave rise to new impediments to trade.
Chronic excess manufacturing capacity in the older manu-
facturing countries and loss of markets for certain industrial
6 Tendenciesin the United States (National Bureau of Economic
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raw materials, notably coal, were inevitable. Most important
of all, raw material producers were placed in a disadvanta-
geous position in relation to industry the world over, from
which they could free themselves only partly and intermit-
tently. In the words of F. C. Mills:
"This cleavage between the prices of industrial raw materials and
of manufactured goods ...affectedeconomic processes through-
out the world. With a limited number of exceptions, raw material
producers in all parts of the world were in a position of marked
economic weakness during the 20'S.Thisweakness led to numer-
ous ill-starred valorization efforts, impaired the purchasing power
of colonial areas, clogged the flow of world trade and placed heavy
strains upon the mechanism of international finance."
These were not the only consequences of what may be de-
scribed as the development of a 'scissors crisis' on a world
scale. The measures taken to help agriculture accentuated the
actual lack of balance in world supply and demand, which
was at the root of the difficulty, and also interfered with the
unifying influence of world market prices for staples. For
example, the limitation of a free world market and govern-
ment subsidies gave rise to a large beet sugar production that
would otherwise not have taken place, and a declining trend
in the price of wheat beginning in 1924 led to measures
partly isolating various parts of the world market. The Cana-
dian price diverged from the Liverpool price as early as 1923,
and by the end of 1925 and the beginning of 1926 agricul-
tural protection in France, Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia,
and Poland resulted in a series of semi-independent wheat
prices in these countries, while for other reasons Russian
wheat prices and those of some of the Danubian countries
diverged widely from the international trend.8 Finally, the
pp. 542—3.
SCf. Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute(Stanford University),
Vol. II, No. 2,p.86, and Vol. II, No. 6, pp. 221—2. Speakingof the period
front December 1925toMarch 1926theInstitute says: "... therehas been
a striking divergence of wheat prices in different countries. The unity or794 EXPERIMENTATION
disparity between raw material and foodstuff prices and those
of manufactured goods altered the barter terms of trade.
Throughout the post-war period up to 1928 states exporting
manufactured goods were able to buy their imports of food-
stuffs and raw materials relatively cheaply, while states ex-
porting crude foodstuffs and raw materials had to give up a
greater quantity of these products than in 1913inexchange
for the same amount of manufactured goods.
Among the legacies of the war and the period of fluctuating
exchanges was a high and ever mounting system of tariffs, and
numerous new trade restrictions. The economic statesmen of
the world recognized that these were an obstacle to funda-
mental economic adjustments, and after the return to gold a
movement was set on foot to reduce them. This movement
culminated in a World Economic Conference which after
long preparationmet in Geneva in May 1927. This Con-
ference adopted a unanimous report recognizing the inter-
dependence of nations and embodying its most important
single conclusion in the statement: "the time has come to put
an end to increases in tariffs and move in the opposite direc-
tion." Its recommendations were never carried out, for the
whole movement for freer trade was destroyed by the world-
wide pressure for agricultural protection after 1928.This
avenue leading toward ultimate solutions was closed because
it was not practical politics, and the war-time legacy of im-
pediments to trade remained and was even added to.
A DECLINING PRICE TREND
Inadequate outlets for existing productive capacity, increased
productive efficiency, and falling per unit costs of production
of manufactured goods and of industrial raw materials, and
simplicity of relation suggested by the term price of wheat' has been
conspicuously absent."
The Conference was proposed to the League Council in September 1925
and its Preparatory Commission was constituted in November 'The
World Economic Conference at Geneva,' Economic Journal, Sept. 1927,pp.
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increasing production of the world's staples, together with
the important, if passing, effects on the under- and overvalua-
tion of currencies, resulted in a tendency for prices to decline
from 1925 to 1929. F. C. Mills has pointed out that wholesale
prices in 28 countries reached a level at some date prior to
TABLE 6i
The Turning Point in Prices in 22 Countries
in relation to Various Events
The turning point is taken as the cpre.recession high' selected by F. C. Mills.
A plus (+) indicates the number of months by which the turning point preceded;
a minus (—),thenumber of months by which it followed the given event.
Own stabi-OwnEngland'sU.S.A.England's
lization return returnpre-reces-pre-reces-
in N. Y.to goldto goldsion highsion high
Lithuania —32 —32 +1 +7 —3
Sweden —30 —10 +3 +9 —
Austria —28 —24 +4 +10 0
Czechoslovakia —23 +15 +4 +10 0
Bulgaria —x3 +23 +3 +9 —I
Finland —17 +4 —3 +3 —7
Germany —15 —1 I —4 +2 —8
Canada —6 +z8 +4 +10 0
Switzerland +9 +9 + 15 +2! +11
Netherlands 0 +5 +6 +12 +2
Estonia —4 +34 +2 +8 —2
Hungary +1 +5 +5 +1! +1
United Kingdom +4 +4 +10
Australia +22 +22 +22 +28
New Zealand +8 +8 +8 +14 +4
South Africa +7 +7 +7 +13 +3
India +7 +29 +7 +13 +3
Denmark +14 +24 +4 +10 0
Belgium +3 +3 —14 —8 —i8
Norway +31 +39 +3 +9 —t
Italy +16 +'6 —15 —9 —19
France —5 +23 —14 —8 —i8
Compiled from F. C. Mills, Economic Tendencies in the United States, pp. 318-9
1928—29 higher than that from which the major declines of
the 'thirties began. This turning point in prices Dr. Mills has
called the 'pre-recession high.' It was reached in almost all
cases in 1924—25. It was not related directly to the dates of
the de facto stabilization in dollars of the currencies of partic-






The Turning Point in Prices in 22Countriesin relation to Various Events
Noolo,k












40 35 30 25 20 lb 0 5 0 5 0 IS 20 25 30 35 40
NooSe, ci i4ootho Bolone otMonthsAll,,THE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE 797
in gold. It was, closely related to the turn down-
ward in prices in Great Britain which took place in January
1925. The United States, in which the turning point came in
November 1925, was one of the last countries to share in this
general trend.'° These time relationships are shown for 22
countries in Table 61 and are indicated graphically in Chart
52. When the whole list of 29 countries for which Dr. Mills
has selected pre-recession highs is arranged in the order in
which the turning points were reached, the concentration
around the turning point in Great Britain is even clearer
(Table 62 A).
For some years after the return to gold the declining trend
in prices was gradual, and there was no consistent pattern in
the behavior of the price levels of large groups of countries.
Prices were working downward more rapidly in Great Britain
than in the United States, and the direct influence of these
two great economic units upon the world price structure was
conflicting. In this general readjustment the effects of under-
and overvaluations of currencies, and of the stabilization
crises in various countries were gradually working them-
selves out.
Dr. Mills has selected a series of dates in 1928 and 1929
when the gradual drift downward was converted into the
rapid decline that marked the beginning of recession in t:he
world business cycle. These dates he has called the recession
highs." They are given for his list of 29 countries in Table
62 B, in chronological order, and in Table 62 C the same
countries are arranged in the order of the size of the decline
in their price levels between their pre-recession and recession
highs, and the number of months intervening between these
two dates is indicated. From these tables a general view of the
character of the price level adjustments of the first four years
of Experimentation can be obtained.
l°Op. cit.,pp. a17—21.The selection of these dates is in itself a difficult sta-
tistical problem. The months are in every case those given by Dr. Mills.
11lbid., p. 317.TABLE 62: Wholesale Price Levels inCountries between Pre-Recession and Recession Highs
ACOUNTRIES IN ORDER OF BCOUNTRIES IN ORDER OF CCOUNTRIES IN ORDER OF PERCENT-
DATES OF PRE-RECESSION HIGHS DATES OF RECESSION HIGHS AGE DECLINE BETWEEN PRE-RECESSION
AND RECESSION HIGHS
Australia July1923 Sweden May 1928 MONTHS
Dutch E. Indies Dec. Norway Aug. PERCENT BETWEEN
Switzerland Feb.1924 Finland Aug. ACE THE 2
New Zealand Sept. Egypt Nov. DECLINE DATES
British India Oct. Spain Nov. Bulgaria 2.1 * 51
South Africa Oct. Japan Dec. Belgium o.8 32
Japan Nov. South Africa Jan. 1929 Finland 1.9 36
Netherlands Nov. Czechoslovakia Feb. Germany 3.3 42
Hungary Dec. Denmark Feb. Estonia 3.9 48
Canada 7.2 55 Spain Dec. Netherlands March United Slates 7.7 44 Austria Jan.1925 Hungary March Austria 8.s 52
Canada Jan. United Kingdom March Czechoslovakia 8.2 49 Czechoslovakia Jan. Estonia March Netherlands 8.6 52
Denmark Jan. Poland March Peru 8.7 22
United KingdomJan. Germany March Australia 9.5 74
Egypt Feb. Belgium March South Africa 9.7 51
Norway Feb. France March Sweden 10.1 39
Sweden Feb. Italy March New Zealand 10.7 6o
Bulgaria Feb. Peru March Lithuania ii.i 48
Estonia March Lithuania April Spain 11.2 47
Dutch E. Indies 14.8 65 Poland March Dutch E. Indies May Hungary i.o 51 Lithuania April Austria May Poland 48
Finland Aug. Bulgaria May United Kingdom i8.i 50
Germany Sept. Switzerland July Japan r8.g 49
United States Nov. United States July India 19.2 59
Belgium July1926 Canada Aug. Egypt 19.9 45
France July Australia Sept. Switzerland 20.2 65
Italy Aug. New Zealand Sept. France 23.4 32
Peru May1927 India Sept. Italy 27.8 31
Denmark 34.6 49
SOURCE: F. C. Mills, op. cit., p. 318 *Increase. Norway 42.4 42THE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE 799
A RIGID PRICE SYSTEM
The tendency of prices to fall was resisted in many ways. In
industry one of the striking features of the period was the
growth of large scale corporate control and monopolistic or
semi-monopolistic practices which made possible a good deal
of price fixing. The adoption of 'rationalization' programs,
taking their example from the most efficiently organized
American industries, and the development of cartel control
of many important industrial products had the same result.
The European steel cartel was probably the most important
single example of price maintenance in industry by such de-
vices, but the movement was of world-wide significance and
has brought into existence a vast literature of its own. In the
extractive industries and agriculture the sequence of events
was large production first, followed by every sort of price
maintenance scheme.
Dr. Mills has listed the products affected by valorization
and price maintenance schemes, together with the years of
their initiation and abandonment. By the time the interna-
tional gold standard facade was completed in 1928—29, this
list had become impressive.12
DATE OF INITIATION DATE OF INITIATION
PRODUCT AND ABANDONMENT PRODUCT AND ABANDONMENT
Crude rubber 1922-28 Quinine 1913-
Coffee 1922- Camphor 1899-
Wheat 1923 (Canada) Cotton (U.S.A.)
1928 (U.S.A.) Copper 1926-
Silk 1914-22 Nitrate 1919-27
1926-28 1928
1929- 1929
Sugar 1925-28 Potash 1924-25
1929- 1926
Steel 1926- Mercury 1928
Aluminum 1926- Sulphur 1923
Manganese 1927 Sisal 1920
Zinc 1928 Rayon 1928
A Deferred Cyclical Adjustment
Looking back upon this situation from the depths of the de-
pression in 1932, one of the most active participants in the
12 Ibid., pp. 327—9.8oo EXPERIMENTATION
World Economic Conference of 1927, whose labors were
largely responsible for the unanimous recommendations in
favor of freer trade, summarized for one of the authors of
these studies the events leading to the world crisis in a man-
ner at once so broad in outlook, so condensed in form, and so
in harmony with the point of view here presented that it pro-
vides an admirable means for drawing together several major
threads of our analysis. This summary began with the as-
sumption that the causes of the crisis lay in the influence of
the war on the world economy: overstimulation of wheat pro-
duction on the North American continent, in South America,
and Australia; overstimulation of industrial enterprises in
the British Dominions, the Far East, Canada, and South
America; overstimulation of cane sugar production during
the war and of beet sugar production after the war. The
maladjustments of world production had been apparent, es-
pecially in agriculture, since 1921, but protective measures by
individual governments sometimes temporarily veiled the
stark facts of relative overproduction from a world point of
view in many commodities. A continuous expansion of credit,
emanating from the United States and Great Britain, facili-
tated, after 1925, the financing of production and trade in
these relatively overproduced commodities at too high a price
range and aggravated the forces of disequilibrium in world
production that had their origin in the World War. The fall
in prices of 1929 was inevitable. Its catastrophic character
was due to the artificiality of the 1929 price structure which
was maintained only by various credit pools, such as the
Canadian wheat pool, the coffee valorization pool, and the
fertilizer pool. Once the banks started to open the bulkheads
between the water-tight compartments of the credit structure,
the sea of fundamental economic forces engulfed the leaking
1929 price structure ship. The banks were not responsible for
the liquidation and the consequent price falls. Economic
forces were stronger than the banks in 1929. But the banks,
especially in the United States and Great Britain, to whichTHE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE
the banking world looked for guidance, were responsible
not having properly understood the economic facts of the
post-war world.
Before 1925 concentration upon the goal of a return to
normal and upon the achievement of stable exchange rates,
and after 1925 the splendors of a stable gold standard blinded
the eyes of bankers and of the world in general. The illusion
that the economic maladjustments would be corrected
automatic forces was dominant in the world's financial
thinking.
THE GENERAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRITICAL DECISIONS OF 1927
Itis in their relation to the prolongation of the flow of inter-
national credits which carried forward unsolved these
economic problems that the critical financial decisions of
1927 assume their major historical importance. One of the
minor oscillations around the rising level of the
phase of the international cycle of 1920—29 was the moderate
depression of 1927 in the United States. This coincided with
a clear demonstration of the inability of the Bank of England
to reduce Bank rate below 41/2percent without danger to
the gold standard because of the fundamental lack of adjust..
ment of the British economy to the new conditions. It
cided also with a critical turning point in the
movement in Germany. Finally, it coincided with a period
which the terms of trade between raw material and foodstuff
producing countries and manufacturing countries were
ing strongly against the former.'3 The inter-central bank co-
operation of 1927 helped to relieve these pressures. It was,
indeed, imperative that they should be relieved if the newly
established and as yet incomplete international gold standard
facade was to be preserved and extended.
13Rawmaterial producing countries had experienced a brief period of
immediately after the return to gold and the resumption of internationaJ
lending; League of Nations, World Economic Survey, 1931/2,p.184, and
chart, p. 185.802 EXPERIMENTATION
The critical decisions of 1927 were taken in the interests
of stability and normal international intercourse, and had the
reliance placed upon the corrective forces of the international
gold standard been well founded, they would have been con-
structive decisions. Had they not been taken, a genuine turn-
ing point would almost certainly have developed in 1927. As
it was, Great Britain was relieved from pressure, the French
policy of returning to gold at the low rate of de facto stabili-
zation was not interfered with, a period of activity, especially
in securities, was encouraged in the United States, capital
flowed to Germany and South America, the rationalization
movement in Germany was as a consequence accelerated, a
continued large commodity export surplus from the United
States was financed, and, finally, the terms of trade between
raw material and food producing countries and industrial
countries, and more broadly speaking the terms of exchange
between agriculture and industry the world over were altered
somewhat in favor of agriculture.14 These effects were for the
most part not permanent, and by the latter part of 1928 the
impetus toward a prolongation of the prosperity phase of the
world cycle was beginning to wear itself out. Thus the action
of the League of Nations Assembly in 1928 in finally agreeing
to proceed to fix the amount of German reparationnot only
came at a time when dammed up economic forces were about
to compel the world to face the unsolved economic problems
left over by the war but also coincided with a deferred cycli-
cal adjustment.
An Unsolved Reparation Problem
Under the Dawes Plan Germany's adherence to the inter-
national gold standard was directly bound up with her repara-
tion obligations, and the transfer protection under the plan
was a guarantee that this great political indebtedness would
14This statement is based upon the chart in ibid., p. 185.
Negotiations for afinal' settlement began on February ii, and the New
Plan wassignedon June 7, 1929.THE EXPERIMENT AS A WHOLE
not be allowed to disrupt the world's new system of exchange
rates. From 1925 to 1928 the series of war debt agreements
begun by the funding of the British war debt to the
States in December 1922 was gradually extended, and in
1929 completed by the ratification of the
Agreement by the French Chamber. These agreements as a
whole diverted the bulk of Germany's payments as the
largest political debtor to the United States, the world's
est political creditor. The whole system rested upon the
double assumption that these sums could be raised in Geir-
many and transferred abroad. It was incomplete in form as
long as the total of German payments was not fixed.
problems raised by it were unsolved as long as the capacfty of
the German budget to raise the amounts required was
ful and the underlying transfer problem was not faced
met. In 1928 the problems of the German budget were aliready
making a reduction in the standard annuity of the Dawes
Plan imperative for Germany and acceptable to the creditor
powers, but the transfer problem did not even then have
be faced squarely. Like the economic problems clusi:ered
about the position of agriculture, or about the
balance of payments, and many others, it was
through the international flow of credits.
The Young Plan completed the system of post-war political
debt settlements by fixing the total German
recognized the interrelations of all these debts by the
mism 'out payments.' 16Itreduced the annual totals, began a
partial commercialization of the reparation obligation, and
brought temporary relief to the German budget through fts
proposal of the so-called 'Young Loan.' But it did not solve
the reparation problem, for this depended upon the
ment of an export surplus by Germany which, according
Dr. Angell, was to be the work of twenty years.
theYoung Plan removed the legal transfer protection of the
16Thereal struggle in Europe over the Young Plan was a
struggle for the surplus not earmarked for the United States.804 EXPERIMENTATION
Dawes Plan, for it was negotiated under the fixed illusion of
stability created by the apparently successful restoration of
normal conditions under the gold standard, and the apparent
prosperity that followed the dispersion of the gathering eco-
nomic clouds of 1927. Legal transfer protection, therefore,
ceased upon the eve of the removal of the real economic
transfer protection afforded to Germany by the steady import
of capital and at a moment when the need of such protection
was about to become urgent. At the same time, the Plan
placed the responsibility for making transfers wholly in Ger-
man hands, and provided a new agency to carry out its pro-
visions and to meet temporary strains that might arise in its
execution—the Bank for International Settlements. This
proposed bank was in a sense a child of the Genoa Confer-
ence.17 Its endowment with functions beyond those related
to reparation was the fulfilment of a movement toward for-
mally organized inter-central bank cooperation to meet the
new technical problems of a divided world which had long
been in progress.
The Young Plan was not ratified until January 1930.It
left as an inheritance for the first years of a world-wide eco-
nomic depression the first genuine reparation transfer prob-
lem since 1922, and started upon its new duties an institution
dedicated to the perfection of the technique of the new gold
standard and the final completion of the gold standard system
on a world-wide scale, just at the moment when the experi-
ment of operating a decentralized world credit structure in
an unbalanced world economy was reaching its crucial test.
General Comparison with the War-Time System
In Chapter 6 we suggest the similarities existing between the
situation just described and the war years. The concluding
section of that chapter and the present section bear the same
caption. In both periods the means of gold standard adjust-
E. L. Dulles, The Bank for International Settlements at Work (Macmillan,
1932), p.i6.
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ment were used to carry forward unsolved economic prob-
lems. 1n both a disregard of long run consequences led to a
distribution of gold not in accordance with the long run
needs of the banking systems of the world, and a distribution
of international credit that was not, in the true economic
sense, a time-bridging operation. Therefore both the effort
to maintain approximately the old system of exchange rates
during the war and the maintenance of the international gold
standard after i925were pegging operations on a vast scale.
As during the war the international lending of the 1920'S
was inflationary in both the lending and borrowing countries.
In virtually all countries from 1925to1929 the expansion of
credit was greater than the growth of industry. Real savings
were less than real investment, and bank liabilities tended,
especially in countries like Germany and Austria whose do.
mestic expansion was largely financed by international loans,
to grow faster than bank capital.18 The decentralization of the
world credit system added to the inflationary effect of this
type of international lending as a result of the competition of
the principal center markets for loans and prestige.
Though not universally applicable to the gold standard of
1925—29, because of the internal stability of France after
1926 and the deflationary pressures in Great Britain, yet over
a wide area, particularly in the United States and Germany,
the whole analysis of the inflationary effects of the accumula-
tion and use of the resources employed in pegging upon the
supply of bank credit, given in Chapter 4, is applicable to
the 1925—29 period. Whether in war or peace, when gold
movements and international lending are used persistently
to maintain a fundamentally unbalanced economic structure,
when international loans are not made from savings and do
not contribute to the production of exports in the borrowing
country or its debtors, then the international gold standard
becomes a temporary exchange pegging device and is an in-
flationary instrument. It ceases to be a guarantee of stability
WorldEconomic Survey, 1932/3,pp.38—141passim,especially pp. 126, 141.8o6 EXPERIMENTATION
and an instrument for facilitating the orderly and progressive
exploitation of the world's resources for the improvement
of the condition of human beings.
Despite all differences in the times, therefore, this general
comparison with the war period has a basic justification. The
comparison of the gold standard facade of 1928—29 with the
pre-war international gold standard system gives only half
the picture and provides an inadequate basis, without the
war-time comparison to supplement it, for an appraisal of the
influences leading to the disintegration of the international
gold standard system from 1929 to 1931.